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11.1  Introduction 
When I first discussed the organization of this volume with Rudiger Dorn- 
busch and Sebastian Edwards, I pointed out that populist macroeconomic pol- 
icies had not been the norm in all of  South America and supported that point 
of  view by stating that in Colombia such policies had never been tried. The 
result of  the discussion was that I was asked to write a paper showing the 
absence of populist  macroeconomics in Colombia, and to explain that phe- 
nomenon. In the first part of this paper I try to show the absence of populist 
economics in Colombia, and in the second part I present some hypotheses of 
how this may have come about. 
Colombia is an atypical Latin American country in many ways. Carlos Diaz 
Alejandro (1985, p. vii) wrote that “Social Scientists have had a difficult time 
fitting Colombian development experience of the last thirty years into fashion- 
able categories such as monetarism, structuralism, bureaucratic-authoritarian- 
ism, and such.” Indeed, except for two short periods of military government, 
it has been a democracy for over 160 years. While the rest of Latin America 
was grappling with the difficulties of redemocratization, Colombia celebrated 
the 100 years of its constitution by deepening democracy through the popular 
election of  mayors, who had been until then appointed by provincial gover- 
nors. At about the same time it was celebrating the twentieth birthday of the 
establishment of the present foreign trade and exchange regime and the system 
of the “crawling peg.” In a continent characterized by very volatile economic 
policies,  Colombia has had essentially  the same economic policy since the 
late sixties. In the late 1970s, while foreign credit was inundating the region, 
Colombia, against the advice and pressure of international organizations and 
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private bankers, actually decreased its foreign debt in order to facilitate mon- 
etary management  during a period  of high  coffee prices.  Finally, Colombia 
has not had populist  economic macroeconomic  policies in this century,  and 
political groups with a populist agenda have never won the presidency or been 
able to obtain important minorities in Congress. I 
Since populist economic policies have been followed by one or more ad- 
ministrations in most countries of Latin America, including Argentina,  Bra- 
zil, Chile, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, Venezuela, and even Mexico,  it is inter- 
esting to explore the reasons why populism has not been popular in Colombia. 
11.2  The Macroeconomic Record 
Dornbusch and Edwards (1989, p.  1) define “economic populism” as: “an 
approach to economics that emphasizes growth and income redistribution  and 
de-emphasizes the risk of inflation and deficit finance, external constraints and 
the reaction of economic agents to aggressive nonmarket policies.” They then 
describe  the  essential  characteristics  of  populist  programs  as  emphasizing 
three elements (p. 6): “reactivation, redistribution of income and restructuring 
of the economy.  . . . The recommended policy is a redistribution  of  income, 
typically by large real wage increases. Inflation not withstanding, devaluation 
is rejected  because of  the inflationary  impact and because it reduces living 
standards. The economy is to be restructured to save on foreign exchange and 
support higher levels of real wages and higher growth.” 
This definition of economic populism would include the economic policies 
of  political  regimes  of  a rather  wide  spectrum, going from the regimes  of 
Velasco and Garcia in Peru, Peron in Argentina, to that of Allende in Chile. 
There is no inconsistency,  however, since the term “populism” has been used 
to cover  a very  wide  spectrum of  political  phenomena.  Margaret Canovan 
(1981), identifies as many as seven different types of populism: revolutionary 
intellectual populism,  peasant populism,  farmer’s radicalism,  populist dicta- 
torship, populist democracy, reactionary populism, and politician’s populism. 
If  we define populist macroeconomics  as the attempt to utilize macroeco- 
nomic policies and government  intervention  in the price system in order to 
redistribute  income, while  deemphasizing  the  risk  of  inflation, the  foreign 
I.  There have been, however, some close calls. After the devaluation of 1961, a much-debated 
decision, the government decreed a large wage increase, which accelerated inflation and wiped 
out many of the benefits of the devaluation. The wage increase was carried out with the announced 
purpose of insuring that workers would not be affected by the devaluation. The political close call 
was much more serious. In the presidential election of  1970, the former dictator, Gustavo Rojas 
Pinilla, lost the election by a few thousand votes after running a populist campaign. Interestingly 
enough, his main criticism of  the government was its lack of decision in the control of inflation, 
and his promise was to stop price increases. In recent years inflation had been running at about 
10% per year. It is significant that the populist political movement created by Rojas received much 
decreased support in the municipal elections two years later and practically disappeared by  the 
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exchange constraint, and fiscal deficits, then evidence of economic populism 
should show up in the statistical series that deal with a country’s major macro 
balances. 
Dornbusch and Edwards (1989) utilize series on the black market exchange 
rate, real wages, and foreign reserves to illustrate populist processes and re- 
sults in the case of Chile and Peru. Their tables show immense fluctuations in 
these variables and systematically show how populist economic policies im- 
prove real wages and employment in the first phase and then lead to balance 
of payment crises, dramatic increases in the black market exchange rate, and 
then sustained decreases in real wages, income per capita, and accelerated 
inflation. 
The Colombian tables show, on the contrary, few large fluctuations. The 
smoothness of  the curves is, I think, good evidence of  the absence of  eco- 
nomic populism. The most interesting table shows the black market exchange 
rate (table 11.1 and fig. 11.1). Not only is it usually very close to the official 
rate, but it has been below it in  some periods. This shows clearly that the 
Colombian authorities have kept the exchange rate fairly close to equilibrium 
Table 11.1  Exchange Rates, International Reserves, and Imports, 1970-89 
International 
Black Market  Reserves 
Black Market  Rate/  (in Millions  Imports 
Exchange  Exchange  Exchange  of  U.S.  (in Millions of  International 
Year  Rate  Rate  Rate  Dollars)  U.S. Dollars)  Reserves/lmports 
1970  19.03 
1971  20.81 
1972  22.70 
1973  24.65 
1974  28.26 
1975  32.84 
1976  36.20 
1977  37.71 
1978  40.79 
1979  43.79 
1980  50.56 
1981  58.64 
1982  69.59 
1983  87.83 
1984  112.74 
1985  169.19 
1986  216.97 
1987  262.08 
1988  332.97 











































































































Relation between black market exchange rate and official 
levels throughout  the period and have not tried to use the exchange rate for 
redistributive purposes. 
Table 11.2 shows the trend in the real exchange rate, the trade balance, and 
the fiscal deficit since 1970. Once again, one sees substantial stability in com- 
parison to other Latin American  countries.  The real  exchange rate became 
revalued at the time of the coffee and drug export boom, despite the efforts of 
the  government  to avoid  this  result through  limits on foreign indebtedness, 
continuation of the crawling peg, and massive open market operations to con- 
trol inflation. This revaluation  was the source of a growing balance of pay- 
ments problem at the end of the seventies, when commodity prices started to 
decrease after 1979, but which was postponed by increases in foreign indebt- 
edness. Although  adjustment  was  postponed  during  1982 and  1983, when 
international reserves  started  to fall rapidly, in part due to a misjudgement 
concerning the possibility of obtaining foreign credit after the Mexican debt 
crisis, adjustment took place successfully in 1984. 
If  one of  the characteristics of populist economics is the attempt to redis- 
tribute income through the expenditure side of  the budget without a concur- 
rent effort to increase tax revenues, then the fiscal deficit columns in table 1 1.2 
show that Colombian  governments  have not been  tempted by  fiscal hetero- 
doxy. In the last three decades there have also not been any wage freezes with 
price  freezes,  although there have been price controls in certain goods and 
implicit subsidies at different  times for wheat,  gasoline,  milk,  and cement. 
Public services tariffs for electricity  and water  have also been controlled at 373  On the Absence of  Economic Populism in Colombia 
Table 11.2  Real Exchange Rate, Tax Revenues, and Fiscal Deficit 
Trade  Current  Percentage with 
Balance  Account  GDP  Respect to GDP 
Real  (in Millions  (in Millions  (in Millions 
Exchange  of  U.S.  of  U.S.  of  U.S.  Tax  Tax  Fiscal 
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9.9  8.0 
10.7  8.1 
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10.5  10.5 




-  3.3 
-  2.6 
-  2.0 
.1 
-  .5 
-  1.3 
-  2.5 
.o 
-  .9 
-1.2 
-  1.5 
-4.0 
-  2.0 
-  .4 
.5 
-.I 
Source: Fedesarrollo data, based on Central Bank and Tax Office statistics. 
'Without exchange gains or losses at B.R. 
levels below long-term marginal costs, with redistributive arguments, but re- 
distribution has been done more through large tariff differentials between rich 
and poor households than through a generalized subsidy. 
Table 1 1.3 shows the gradual growth in real wages and cyclical increases 
and decreases that are much less abrupt than in those countries of the region 
that have experimented with populist economics. One does not see the 50% 
drop in  real wages  from  1971 to  1974 shown for Chile by Dornbusch  and 
Edwards (1989), or the similar drop in real wages in Peru in  1988. The large 
real wage decreases during the recent adjustment in Mexico are also of a much 
larger magnitude than anything ever seen in Colombia. 
Table 11.3 also shows the inflation record in  Colombia, which, although 
high by international standards, is low by Latin American standards. The in- 
flation rate is also surprisingly constant, once one takes into account the up- 
ward ratchet of the early 1970s. The smoothness of all these statistical series 
is good evidence of the absence of populist economic policies. 
Jeffrey Sachs (1989) has postulated a relationship between populist macro- 
economics and income distribution. He has argued that the bitterness of class 
and sectorial conflicts throughout Latin America reflects the extreme inequal- 374  Miguel Urrutia 
1970  1972  1974  1976  1978  1980  1982  1984  1986  1988 
Fig. 11.2  Relation between net international reserves and imports in 
the same year 
Source: Fedesarrollo 
ities of  income in the region, and that the large group of people that feel they 
are not benefiting from economic development tend to support those politi- 
cians that promise a different strategy for improving the general welfare. In 
Latin America, according to Sachs, that alternative strategy has been populist 
economics. 
Colombia, like the majority of the countries of  the region, has had a very 
unequal distribution of  income. According to Chenery and Syrquin (1975), 
around 1965, the highest earning 20% of the labor force in Colombia received 
about 60% of  total income,  a proportion similar to that  found in Mexico, 
Peru,  and  Brazil.  Since then,  however,  while  the  income distribution has 
changed little or deteriorated in other countries of the region, it has improved 
substantially in Colombia.  London0 (1989) has shown that the Colombian 
Ginis have decreased significantly both in the urban as well as the rural areas, 
and for the country as a whole. He shows a decrease in the Gini coefficient 
from 0.57 in 1964 to 0.45 in 1988. Even more interesting is his estimate that, 
according to international patterns, Colombia should have had a Gini of 0.47 
in 1964, a figure much lower than that actually observed, while at the level of 
per capita income of  1988, the expected Gini was 47%,  a level above the 
observed statistic.  In summary, there seems to have been  a significant im- 
provement in income distribution in Colombia in the last two decades. We 
will come back to this phenomenon, since it may have something to do with 
the absence of populist economics in the country. 375  On  the Absence of Economic Populisni in Colombia 
Table 11.3  Real Wages and Unemployment 
Real Wages,  Real Wages,  Real  Unemployment in 
Yearly Change  Industrial  Agricultural  Minimum  Bogota 
in Consumer  Workers  Workers  Wages 



















































































































































































































Sources: Fedesarrollo  data, based  on National  Department  Ofice Statistics. Unemployment Bogota: 
1963-1975,  in Miguel Urmtia, “Los de aniba y 10s de abajo,” Fedesmollo, 1984. 
11.3  Populism and Clientelism 
We have defined populist economics as the attempt to redistribute income 
and power with the tools of macroeconomic management: the use of exchange 
rates,  wage policy, price policy, and monetary  policy. The political  science 
literature would not find the use of  the term populism inadequate to describe 
this phenomena, since there seems to be consensus in considering,  as Nicos 
Mouzelis (1985, p. 330) does, that “All forms of  populism without exception 376  Miguel Urrutia 
involve some form of exaltation of and appeal to the ‘people’ and all are in 
one sense or another anti-elitist.” 
Mouzelis (1985, p. 332) also writes that there are two fundamental modes 
of  vertical  political  inclusion  that  are typical  in the parliamentary  semipe- 
riphery: clientelism and populism. The argument I would like to make is that 
in Colombia political development has led to a rather sophisticated form of 
clientelism instead of toward populism. 
Clientelism is one way to solve the problems created by political mobiliza- 
tion and enlarged political participation. It consists of the use of vertical net- 
works of  patron-client  relationships  for bringing  lower-class  strata  into na- 
tional politics. In its more advanced forms, the private patron-client network 
is expanded dramatically through the use of the government budget to multi- 
ply the patron’s favors. Leal (1989), writing on clientelism in Colombia, dif- 
ferentiates its modem version from the more traditional basis of personal po- 
litical power, which was also based on the exchange of favors and obligations. 
Traditionally,  however, in the absence of  a strong state with command over 
substantial economic resources, this relationship was of a private nature. Thus 
the large landowner was the patron, and he provided his clients favors out of 
his own command over economic resources. The political system that resulted 
from this  network  of  favors versus  political  support at  election  time  was 
known during the nineteen century as gamonalismo or caciquismo. 
Loyalty and faithfulness, as the basis of  the exchange of  services, consti- 
tuted the social values that supported and gave ideological content to the sys- 
tem. These values are still present now and are reflected  in the strong alle- 
giance of individuals to the political party of  their families. In Colombia, it is 
still unacceptable for any politician to shift parties, and few individuals would 
in the past openly declare that they have voted for a candidate of a different 
party, although this is beginning to happen more frequently now. 
Modem clientelism differs from the more traditional forms of  political al- 
legiance because  politicians  now  do not have  to finance the favors to their 
clients out of their own assets. The growth of  the state has given politicians 
command over public funds, and these are used to maintain the political net- 
works. Leal (1989, p.  12) correctly points out that the new political leader, 
born of modem clientelism, is no longer dependent on the prestige and eco- 
nomic power of  his position in the productive system. 
In other words, he no longer has to be a latifundista, or a prestigious pro- 
fessional. This has led to the development of a professional class of politicians 
specialized in intermediating between the state and the voter. As we will see, 
one of the results of the system is that in Colombia public expenditure is very 
redistributive,  and the poor have greater access to public  services  and pro- 
grams than in other countries of Latin America. 
Ideologues and intellectuals find clientelistic democracy repugnant, and in 
Colombia clientelism has a very bad name. It is considered immoral to have a 
system in which the resources of  the state are used in part in the interest of 377  On the Absence of  Economic Populism in Colombia 
maximizing individual political support. Internationally, clientelism also has 
a bad name. Japanese democracy, which is very close to the ideal clientelistic 
regime, does not have a very good name in the international press or among 
Japanese intellectuals or the Japanese press, and yet the system has produced 
a very egalitarian society, spectacular economic growth, and the voters seem 
satisfied with the system.* 
Mouzelis (1985) considers that the second major and  often antagonistic 
mode of political inclusion prevalent in capitalist developing countries is pop- 
ulism. The most obvious, as well as the most-often discussed, difference be- 
tween clientelism and populism stems from the ideological themes of popu- 
list discourse,  which  focus predominantly on the  antagonism between the 
“people” and the “establishment,” “the poor” and “the rich,” which, as a rule, 
plays a lesser role in nonpopulist ideologies. Populism also emphasizes the 
leader’s charisma and the necessity for direct, nonmediated rapport between 
the leader and his or her “people.” 
In this perspective, the Sachs hypothesis of  a close relationship between 
unequal income distribution and the popularity of populism makes sense. It is 
therefore necessary to explain why in an unequal society such as that of  Co- 
lombia populist politics have not prospered. Various factors may explain why 
Colombian politics have developed in the direction of clientelism and not pop- 
ulism. 
11.4  The Impact of Clientelism on Economic Policy 
The first factor that has worked against the development of  populism has 
been  the strength of  the traditional political parties.  Before the Colombian 
territory was integrated into a modern nation-state and a national market-the 
latter did not occur until the 1930s-there  already existed two strong political 
parties. When the two parties emerged in the 1840s, the country was divided 
into fairly autonomous and economically independent regions.  Before  the 
complete consolidation of the nation-state and of a national market, one of the 
2. The Japanese political system is also based on loyalty and networks of  reciprocal favors, and 
politicians mobilize the vote through organized support groups of individuals who are tied to the 
individual politician  by  receiving  favors from  him.  These may vary  from the preence of  the 
politician at a wedding of a relative, including the cash gift that he must provide, to the pressure 
on the Ministry of Public Works to build an expensive tunnel that will shorten substantially the 
distance from a village to the nearest provincial capital. Books and articles on the Japanese polit- 
ical system make fascinating reading for a Colombian, both because of the similarities but also 
because of the way clientelism in Japan seems to have achieved greater efficiency and respectabil- 
ity by  being more closely integrated into aspects of the culture that are highly valued, such as 
loyalty and the system of mutual obligations. According to Dore (1958, p. 210). “The receipt of 
favours acknowledged to create an obligation of  indebtedness but in no way detracting from the 
individual’s sense of self respect, and the granting of favours in conscious expectation of a return 
in loyal service, the genuine and positive approval of the sentiments of personal loyalty to superi- 
ors and protective solicitude for inferiors,  . . . all these features of the patron-client relationship 
. . . are a useful tool for ‘getting on’ in Japanese society.” For more on Japanese politics and 
society, see Curtis (1983). Dore (1973), Fukutake (1982). Ike (1978), and Thayer (1973). 378  Miguel Urrutia 
main  integrating  forces was  the existence of  the national  political  parties. 
These parties, in turn, were strengthened by the fact that access to political 
power occurred throughout  the nineteenth century and the twentieth century 
through the ballot box. 
Although  the  only way  to gain  control  of  the  national  government  was 
through political parties that cut across provincial lines and class and occupa- 
tional lines, the political  power base was local. This meant that the political 
parties were a federation of local political bosses, and a national party politi- 
cal machine never developed. The presidential candidates of  the parties have 
been chosen by  the most powerful  local political  barons, who usually con- 
trolled blocks of senators and representatives,  who in turn controlled the party 
nominating conventions. 
Partisan newspapers and magazines played an important role in maintaining 
both unity and enthusiasm in the parties or party factions, and the owners of 
those newspapers were also influential in the choice of candidates and in the 
political agenda of  the parties. Given the importance of  the partisan press for 
the loosely organized and decentralized political parties, the principle of a free 
and independent press was maintained  throughout  the country’s republican 
history. As we shall see, the existence of an independent press has been im- 
portant for economic policy, because  it has insured a permanent auditing of 
the government’s economic decisions. 
Although  ideology played a part in the two traditional parties, the Liberal 
and Conservative  parties,  at election  time the votes  were mobilized  by  the 
local boss. He did this essentially by building a political machine that would 
reward him with votes at election time in return for favors rendered through- 
out the  years.  The boss’s  network  of  political  debts is  created  by  helping 
people get jobs, sometimes in the private sector but mostly in the public sec- 
tor, by getting scholarships for the children of members of his support group, 
and by having the state build  infrastructure  or extend public services to the 
municipality or urban neighborhood where the clientele is being built up. In 
some cases, although they are less frequent than claimed by editorializers or 
opposition candidates, the local boss will actually pay for votes. More often, 
he has been expected to pay for food, drink, and musicians at political rallies. 
As can be seen, the functions of the local political boss do not differ very 
much from those of  the traditional urban political boss in the United States, 
and it must be remembered that the local political machines in that country 
played  the  important role of  integrating  immigrants and  minorities  to the 
economy. In the United States public works contracts not only created jobs for 
the immigrant minorities, and more recently  the black  minorities, but  also 
helped to create businessmen and capitalists  out of those minorities.  In Co- 
lombia, politics has also been an important source of social mobility. 
The local politician needs favors from the state in order to extend his clien- 
tele, but he also needs political conditions that will not drive that clientele to 
abandon him or the party out of  exasperation with the prevailing state of  the 379  On the Absence of Economic Populism in Colombia 
economy. In particular, inflation seems to be very unpopular with the voters. 
It affects everybody, at all times. Thus both the local politician, and the head 
of state, have a very limited tolerance for inflation.  As has been mentioned, 
the one time that a populist candidate came close to winning a presidential 
election was in  1970, when General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla ran on a platform 
of diminishing  the cost of living.  Since within  the political  class there  has 
been sufficient economic literacy for the spread of  the belief that there is some 
relationship  between  money  supply and fiscal deficits and inflation, neither 
local politicians or the head of state are willing to risk the wrath of the public 
by  supporting expansionist fiscal or monetary policies in order to obtain the 
doubtful political gains generated by faster growth or less unemployment,  if 
the possible cost is inflation. In fact, President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, of 
the majority liberal party, ran and won on a platform of sound money (moneda 
sana), and the present  presidential  candidate  of  that party  (Cesar Gaviria), 
declared in his acceptance speech at the party convention that sound money 
was one of the most important historical commitments of his party. 
The Colombian system works with a well-defined division of labor. Indus- 
trialists, bankers, and traders produce goods and services in the private sector 
and sometimes lobby government for privileges, but they have little influence 
in Congress and with the political class, although this may be changing due to 
the increasing costs of  waging political campaigns in a mass society. The di- 
vision of labor is less clear between farmers and politicians,  since in certain 
regions people have both occupations. But, in general, there is a political class 
quite distinct from the entrepreneurial  class and from the labor unions.  The 
business of this class is to get elected, and politics is its source of income. 
The political class is therefore pragmatic and nonideological.  In addition, 
since politics is a very efficient road to social advancement, the political class 
is not only not obsessed with ideology, but it also feels fairly committed to the 
system (lus instituciones). Although often reformist, the politicians of the tra- 
ditional parties, who always win over 80% of the vote, do not find leftist and 
populist calls for a radical restructuring of the economy attractive. Traditional 
politicians  are not  enthusiastic  about  radical  income or asset redistribution 
plans, but do believe strongly in distributing the budget widely to reward their 
clientele. 
Since there are clearly contradictory  attitudes between  entrepreneurs and 
politicians with respect to the way the government budget should be distrib- 
uted,  with  entrepreneurs  pushing  for  subsidies  that  will  favor production, 
while politicians  will prefer expenditures  that will maximize the number of 
votes in their favor, it makes a difference which group has the most influence 
in  government.  When  businessmen  and  labor unions  have more  influence, 
public  expenditure  will  concentrate  on  subsidizing the rather  small  formal 
sector of the economy. When the local politicians have more influence, public 
expenditure will concentrate in subsidizing government services to the great- 
est  number  of  poor  voters.  The Colombian  political  system  concentrates 380  Miguel Urrutia 
power in the local politician, and therefore there are few subsidies to the pri- 
vate sector or state enterprises-if  we  do not count the implicit subsidies of 
the protection afforded by trade policy-while  the government budget is spent 
in a fairly progressive way. 
In the early seventies, (Urrutia and Berry 1976, pp. 172-73)  I tried to cal- 
culate the redistributive impact of  the public sector in Colombia and con- 
cluded that the tax system was slightly progressive and that public expenditure 
redistributed income significantly to the poorest 50% of  the population. It 
would appear that, around 1966, the lowest quintile of the income distribution 
increased its income by 72% after taxes and the explicit and implicit subsidies 
of public expenditure, with respect to its pretax income. 
Selowsky (1979) carried out special surveys in 1974 to determine the redis- 
tributive impact of government expenditures, and he too gets results that sug- 
gest that such expenditures benefit the poor more than proportionally. How- 
ever, this may be the case in many countries, and Colombia may therefore not 
be  exceptional.  Comparing the impact of  social expenditures in Colombia 
with  similar estimates for other Latin American countries that have similar 
levels of development and different political systems would be interesting, but 
the data is not readily available, although it could, in the future, be  put to- 
gether. Table  ll  .4 is a first approximation. It shows that Colombia spent a 
smaller proportion of  GDP on  education than  Argentina, Costa Rica,  and 
Chile, but only Chile distributed that expenditure in a clearly more progres- 
sive way. Given that all of the countries in the table, with the exception of the 
Dominican Republic, have the most equitable income distributions in the re- 
gion, and much better than that of Colombia, the progressiveness of  public 
expenditure in education in Colombia is impressive. Expenditure on health, 
on the other hand, is both low and not particularly progressive. 
However, in the discussion on the methods of clientelism, it was suggested 
that the government services that were used to expand the clientele were typi- 
cally public services such as electricity, water, and telephone services, as well 
as the distribution of subsidized agricultural credit, scholarships, and employ- 
ment in the public sector. 
Selowsky (1979) explored who benefited from these types of  public ex- 
penditures. The results of that research are interesting. Although the rich had 
more services in  1974, the proportion of  households that received these ser- 
vices between  1970 and  1974 was  much higher in the first quintile of  the 
income distribution. While 11.3% of new connections to the electricity grid 
was for households in the upper quintile of the income distribution, the pro- 
portion reached 26% in the first quintile. Access to piped  water was even 
better for the poor. While 3  1.4% of all new households receiving piped water 
belonged to the lowest quintile of the income distribution, only 5.6% of new 
connections benefited the top quintile in those four years. 
Subsidized agricultural loans also benefited primarily small farmers. Fully 
82.8% of  the credit subsidy went to the first three quintiles of  the income 381  On the Absence of Economic Populism  in Colombia 
Table 11.4  The Impact of Social Expenditure on Income Distribution 
Dominican 
Argentina  Costa Rica  Chile  Republic  Uruguay  Colombia 
(1980)  (1982)  (1982)  (1980)  (1982)  (1974) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Proportion of educational 
subsidy with respect 
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divided by  average 
28.5  30.8  77.0 
12.9  18.2  31.4 
8.4  10.6  17.5 
5.1  9.3  8.2 
3.0  3.9  2.9 
7.6  9.2  9.9 
3.75  3.35  7.17 
15.6  42.1  31.5 
3.4  14.0  19.1 
2.7  12.0  9.7 
.8  6.8  4.1 
.2  2.3  .9 
2.3  8.4  4.7 








17.3  18.0 
7.1  11.0 
4.8  7.0 
3.3  5.0 
1.2  2.2 
4.0  5.0 
4.3  3.6 
23.8  16.5  5.0 
5.3  8.8  2.5 
4.4  3.8  1.6 
2.0  I .5  .9 
.5  .9  .2 
3.0  3.5  I .o 
7.9  4.7  5.0 
Sources: Cols. 1-5,  Petrei (1987); col. 6, Selowsky (1979). 
distribution. Educational scholarships, on the other hand, did not seem to be 
distributed in a progressive manner. No analysis has been made of the social 
origins of public employees, but there is clear evidence that the different levels 
of government pay above labor-market  rates for unskilled  work, and below 
market rates for skilled and managerial public employment. 
In summary, the Colombian political system, very dependent on clientelis- 
tic practices, is not admired by national and foreign intellectuals,  but  it re- 
ceives support from more than 80% of the voters in election after election. In 
the last two decades it has produced economic growth, an improved income 
distribution, and fairly progressive government expenditures. Its very success 
is the main source of its weakness, since voters have systematically excluded 
minorities that want radical change from power, and this has driven such mi- 382  Miguel Urrutia 
Table 11.5  GDP Growth: 1965-86 
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norities to violence and guerrilla activity.  Since many  in the political class 
have experienced upward mobility, these political leaders have not been very 
eager to increase tax  burdens and  to increase  public  expenditure in  social 
safety nets. What is clear, however, is that such a political class does not find 
the populist  appeal to restructure the economy very attractive,  and it prefers 
microeconomic redistribution of income through the budget to massive redis- 
tribution through  macroeconomic policy and the radical restructuring  of the 
economy. 
11.5  The Political Process of Electing Presidents 
To understand the absence of populism in Colombia, it is necessary to ana- 
lyze the sources of power of the head of state, since populism is closely related 
to  the  charisma and the direct relationship  of  the head  of  state with  “the 
people .” 
In Colombia it is very difficult for a politician to win a presidential election 
if  he is not from one of the two traditional parties; the exception might arise 
if, for some reason, there emerge serious divisions  within  both parties, and 383  On the Absence of  Economic Populism  in Colombia 
they field various candidates. This is unlikely, but not impossible.  Since the 
sixties, the liberal party has been a majority, and for a conservative to win the 
presidency  he has to appeal to the uncommitted  voters and to some liberals 
who may switch their allegiance, and therefore there is more of a tendency for 
the conservatives to field populist candidates. 
However, since political power is dispersed among regional political barons 
who are jealous of their colleagues, these political operatives tend to choose 
presidential  candidates at the party convention or support candidates during 
national primaries who are different from themselves and who will not create 
a personal power base at their expense. They need a sympathetic president, 
who will name their friends to positions of power and give them access to the 
budget, but they are not interested in a head of state who will create a power 
base of  political leaders dependent directly on him, thus making it possible to 
bypass them. They tend to choose presidential candidates who have high pres- 
tige, and this  usually  means intellectuals  or technocrats  who have been  in 
politics, but who have kept somewhat above the day-to-day clientelistic work. 
The system, therefore, tends to produce presidential  candidates  who are 
very well read and informed, well traveled,  but with some practical experi- 
ence of politics. Although two or three presidents since the thirties have been 
more interested in poetry or international affairs than in economics, and have 
actually  disliked  having  to deal with  economic decision  making, as a rule 
Colombian presidents are well versed in economics and understand that pop- 
ulist  economics or postponing the political  costs of  certain inevitable eco- 
nomic decisions only produces short-term benefits. 
The political structure of the parties produces a congress and city councils 
mostly interested in distributing the budget to the largest number of potential 
clients, but who are also aware that fiscal deficits are dangerous because of the 
unpopularity of inflation.  Politicians love fiscal deficits in local governments 
or public enterprises that they control, if these can be transferred to the nation, 
since this is an efficient way of forcing a redistribution of the budget in their 
favor, but  they  expect the national  government to avoid generating  a fiscal 
deficit, since this will be inflationary, and it has been shown that inflation hurts 
incumbents. A good part of the job of a minister of finance is to avoid being 
forced to make unplanned expenditures to bail out local authorities who have 
managed  to spend more than  they have  and then also manage to force the 
nation to come to their help by the application of political power or the threat 
of street disruptions or violence. 
At the same time that the political structure creates a low tolerance for infla- 
tion, the system produces heads of  state who are knowledgeable  about eco- 
nomics and who will not try to create large new political movements on the 
basis  of  large-scale redistribution  programs based  on  populist  economics; 
after all, they are working  within  established  political parties,  and there  is 
little chance of retaining influence without the support of the political barons. 
(As the conservative party becomes weaker among the voters, there is a phe- 384  Miguel Urrutia 
nomenon that is becoming more serious: that is, the temptation for a Conserv- 
ative president, who has won an election against a divided liberal party or on 
a populist platform, to try to use populist economics to maintain the minority 
party in power and thus rebuild that party’s clientele by producing short-term 
economic benefits before an election.) 
On the contrary, the political class and the voters are very suspicious of 
excessive popularity. A good proof of this is that few presidents have been 
named for a second term; only one was elected for a second term since the 
1920s and he had to resign halfway through that term due to lack of political 
support from his own party and very virulent opposition from the other party. 
Thus Colombian presidents have achieved the maximum of their power when 
elected, and they cannot increase it through the tools of  populism.  This is a 
large disincentive to populist economics. As a rule it is also more likely for a 
candidate to be elected through the support of the local political bosses than 
by appealing over their heads to “the people” in the populist tradition. 
The optimistic hypothesis presented  here is, therefore, that populist eco- 
nomic policies will not emerge in well-established democracies, where there 
is no possibility of rapidly consolidating a new political movement. In Argen- 
tina or Peru, where, in a democratization process, a head of state is willing to 
gamble in the short run with economic policy in order to consolidate a new 
political  movement,  populist  economics,  which  produces  short-term  gains 
and long-term losses,  may be more attractive than in Colombia, where no 
amount of short-term prosperity will transform a political system and political 
parties that have been in power for over 160 years. 
11.6  The Role of Technocrats 
In the Japanese system of political clientelism the role of the technocrats in 
economic policy has been important. Although the characteristics of the civil 
service and the system of  recruitment is very different in Colombia, techno- 
crats have played an important role in forming economic policy there as well. 
One interesting feature of the Colombian system is that, given the danger 
of concentrating all of the clientelistic potential of the Ministry of Finance in 
the hands of  a politician or a political faction, there has been, since the war, 
the practice of naming an industrialist or a technocrat as minister of finance. 
In  addition,  institutional  innovations,  such as the creation  of  the Monetary 
Board to handle monetary policy, and the contracts with the Coffee Federation 
have given the minister of finance virtually total power in the areas of mone- 
tary,  fiscal, and exchange policy.  These areas have therefore been  isolated 
from day-to-day politics and put in the hands of technocrats. Since the early 
seventies many of the ministers of finance have had postgraduate degrees in 
economics, and the rest have worked at some time as economic consultants. 
Since the minister of finance is not a politician, and his capacity of building a 
power base from scratch at the ministry is limited, the temptations of populist 
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Another area where technocrats have dominated is the Planning Depart- 
ment, an agency that has been responsible for the government investment bud- 
get, the management of foreign credit (with the Ministry of Finance), and the 
production of the government’s Development Plan, which serves as a frame- 
work for economic policy. When in  1967 the department was reformed, the 
precedent was  set that recruitment to all high  posts in the agency required 
postgraduate studies, and, to reach head of division, the candidate had to be 
at least a Ph.D.  candidate.  (Even now  there are no Ph.D.  programs in  the 
country, so the candidates had to have done postgraduate work abroad.) Thus 
the Planning Agency has been essentially a technical department, advising the 
president on economic policy, and its officers by and large remain out of poli- 
tics. Politicians often complain bitterly about the lack of realism and respon- 
siveness of  the planning department to “popular needs,” but they have not 
pressured to make it  a clientelistic bastion, and, as a rule,  presidents have 
defended its decisions and used its staff in the process of  economic decision 
making. 
The role of the international institutions in strengthening and giving legiti- 
macy to the technocrats in the economic area has also been important. The 
decisions of the technocrats gain legitimacy when they can produce loans to 
back them up. 
11.7  The Role of the Fourth Estate 
The other phenomenon that has worked against populist economics is the 
existence of  complete  freedom of  the press.  When  populist economics is 
tried-as  it often is at the micro level and sometimes economic policy does 
drift towards populist macroeconomics-there  is  substantial criticism, first 
from the specialized press, and then more generally from newspapers, televi- 
sion, and radio commentators. 
If the criticism is justified, upon being alerted, private pressure groups mo- 
bilize against such policies.  When  independent experts criticize economic 
policy, private pressure groups can more legitimately attack the government 
since they are presumably not doing it from a narrow self-interest point of 
view, but are instead backed by independent, expert opinion. 
Another factor that makes possible open debate of economic policies is that 
economists have alternative sources of income to the government. In the first 
place, some of the best universities are private, and so government censorship 
is  more  difficult. Second,  the  private  pressure  groups utilize  independent 
economists to argue their case before the bureaucracy, and this is an alterna- 
tive form of employment to the government. Finally, since the parties are not 
highly centralized,  and different factions come to power at different times, 
economists that criticize the government now may be in the next government, 
and this makes the persecution of dissenters less attractive. 
Finally, it must be admitted that governments that try to implement populist 
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Although  they may  be in thc fringe of  the profession, they tell the populist 
politician what he wants to hear. The free press and frequent public debates in 
Colombia means that most economists have to face the market test for their 
ideas. By the time an economist reaches an important position in government 
or as advisor to a presidential  candidate, he has had to explain his ideas in 
public, and his peers have had a chance to let people know whether those ideas 
are completely on the fringe or not.  Foreign  observers are therefore always 
surprised to find that Colombia’s best-known economists are never those who 
held extreme ideological positions, and that although they disagree sometimes 
strongly on the specifics of  economic policy, they  continue to  talk  to each 
other. There are Colombian structuralists, but all of them dislike fiscal deficits 
of more than 3.5% of GNP. 
Another factor that  has made Colombian economists antipopulist  is that 
many of  them have had short experiences in the public sector and thus learned 
the limits of  power of the  state and how difficult it is to make government 
regulations  effective.  Due to low salaries, professionals  cannot stay long in 
the public sector, and so there is a large pool of economists who have returned 
to the private  and academic sector more than  willing  to use  the press  and 
specialized publications to discuss the latest changes in economic policy. 
Criticism from abroad is also an additional factor that works against popu- 
list macroeconomics. Maybe due to the lack of control by foreign investment 
of  important sectors of the economy, Colombia is not terribly  nationalistic, 
and Colombians in general respect foreign opinion. Criticism of certain poli- 
cies by  international  institutions  such as the World Bank or Inter-American 
Development Bank does not generate support for those policies, as it does in 
other countries of  Latin America. Foreign experts and academics also have 
prestige and are often used to legitimize reforms in which the president of the 
technocracy  are interested. Since economic populism  has not been fashion- 
able among the foreign experts that  deal  with  Colombia, this has been  an 
additional factor that has created disincentives to populist economics. 
11.8  Conclusion 
In conclusion, the presence of  well-established political parties, the clien- 
telistic  nature of  politics, the  concentration  of  political  power  at  the  local 
level, and the existence of a free press are factors that help explain the absence 
of  populist  macroeconomics in  Colombia. This suggests the optimistic  hy- 
pothesis that as democracy is consolidated  in the region, the plague of popu- 
list macroeconomics will disappear. The process will be hastened, however, if 
the  analysis of  the  inevitably  disastrous effects of  these  policies  by  Latin 
American and foreign economists becomes more widely known. 387  On the Absence of Economic Populim in Colombia 
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Comment  Juan I>. Cariaga 
With the twenty-first century fast approaching, it is incredible that in Latin 
America-not  to mention elsewhere-some  governments are still attempting 
to adopt populist policies. It is almost as though we were dealing with a more 
or less unconscious predisposition on the part of some politicians to treat gov- 
ernment power as if it were there only to benefit one or more specific pressure 
groups.  In the final analysis, this amounts to little more than an attempt to 
achieve a certain desired vote count in the next election, coupled with a pro- 
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found ignorance of the rudiments of economics-not  to mention the rules of 
common sense. 
Consequently, it is not surprising to see that in some countries populist pol- 
iticians who have realized their past mistakes are now returning to public life 
to apply more orthodox measures to the running of the government. The un- 
fortunate thing is that this process of on-the-job training in the art of govern- 
ment has incurred high economic and social costs that the countries in ques- 
tion are now obliged to pay. 
In his interesting and thorough paper, Miguel Urrutia takes up this subject 
to postulate that Colombia, unlike other Latin American countries, has been 
characterized  by  a lack of populism. Urrutia  begins  this task  by  gathering 
together  various  definitions  of  “macroeconomic  populism”  and  eventually 
sketches out a definition of his own. He then goes on to evaluate the macro- 
economic variables in Colombia. Given the conspicuous absence of  fluctua- 
tion  in the black  market  for foreign exchange, in real  wages, or in foreign 
reserves,  he concludes that this country does not represent a typical case of 
populist behavior like Chile or Peru. Urrutia also describes how, in Colombia, 
the expenditure side of the budget has not been used as a means of redistrib- 
uting  income and how even the most recalcitrant political circles have been 
ill-disposed toward the idea of inflation. 
In addressing the subject of clientelism and its impact on the economy, Ur- 
rutia notes that the Colombian political system does depend upon clientelistic 
practices, but that the strength of the political parties, the clearly defined pro- 
cess for electing the president, the existence of complete freedom of the press, 
the educational level of the leadership,  and the highly important role played 
by the technocrats have effectively precluded populism in Colombia. 
Urrutia’s paper is unquestionably of great interest and sheds a great deal of 
light upon the lessons that the rest of Latin America can leam from Colombia. 
I would like to contribute just a few brief comments on this subject: 
1. First, a word about definitions. Urrutia in his paper reviews several defi- 
nitions on macroeconomic  populism  and adds one of  his own. It is on this 
basis that he concludes that there is an absence of populism in Colombia. The 
question then is: Are these definitions applicable to all other cases? For ex- 
ample, how  populist  are we to consider the  so-called orthodox program  in 
Bolivia,  under which an ill-advised reactivation program was put into effect 
in 1987. The problem with definitions in general-and  not just with this spe- 
cific definition-is  that they cannot specify precisely  the essential nature of 
what  they  are defining.  As a result,  they  leave gray or undefined  zones in 
which their validity is limited, giving rise to a host of exceptions. On the other 
hand, I believe that Urrutia’s claim that populism is entirely absent from Co- 
lombia may be a bit too rigid. This certainly appears to be the case when the 
author himself  explains that Colombia still maintains price controls and im- 
plicit  subsidies-practices  that, as we  all know, have as their fundamental 
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2. When Urrutia claims that there is a lack of  populism in Colombia, but 
that the system depends upon clientelistic practices, it is pertinent to ask the 
following question: To what extent is clientelism a form of populism? Until 
an adequate answer can be found to this question, it is difficult to state cate- 
gorically  whether  or not  some form of  populist expression  has  manifested 
itself in Colombia. This is all the more true when one considers the manner in 
which  politicians  in  Colombia seek to  bestow  political  favors  with  public 
money. 
That being said, it is important to stress that Urrutia’s description shows us 
that Colombia does constitute an atypical case in Latin America. It is as if one 
were dealing with a unique island in a region where uninhibited political deal- 
ing  and  irresponsible  use  of  national  budgets  are  time-honored  traditions 
among political parties. In Colombia, the magic word is “gradualism.” All the 
actions of pressure groups, whether they be trade unions or regional interests, 
have always been characterized by the gradual nature of their demands. These 
demands have always respected the principles of good government and shown 
a steadfast aversion to the risk of inflation.  In this respect, Urrutia’s paper is 
an important piece of work that allows us to describe a relatively durable and 
significantly long-lasting phenomenon atypical of Latin America as a whole. 
3. Despite  the  fact  that  Colombia has  made  significant  progress  against 
populist economic practices,  it still has some major barriers to surmount be- 
fore it can truly accommodate itself to the new international economic order. 
For all its virtues,  and for all the profound differences from the rest of Latin 
America described  in Urrutia’s  paper,  Colombia still has a legacy from the 
past.  Among other things, this legacy manifests itself in domestic industrial 
protectionism,  import  prohibitions,  tariff restrictions,  and  other  such mea- 
sures, which Colombia needs to change in light of what is transpiring else- 
where in the world. 
Moreover,  Colombia and Latin America will face a new challenge in the 
coming decade. This challenge is posed by the sweeping changes now under- 
way in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. As these economies resolve their 
convertibility and stabilization problems and consolidate their free-market re- 
forms, they will become a sizable market for the countries of Latin America. 
Once this  large new  market gets established,  it will need  agricultural com- 
modities, foodstuffs, and energy-related products to support its development. 
Colombia  and the other Latin  American countries must prepare themselves 
for this eventuality. Doing so will require profound structural adjustments in 
their economies in order to breathe new life into the economic structures and 
orient them toward exporting  the resources  those emerging market may  re- 
quire. 390  Miguel Urrutia 
Comment  Guillermo A. Calvo 
Why has Colombia succeeded in avoiding the bouts of very high inflation that 
have beset its neighbors in the postwar era and, particularly,  during the last 
decade? This is the central question that this most-inspiring paper by Miguel 
Urrutia attempts to answer. 
Urrutia’s thesis is that a country’s institutional characteristics play a central 
role in policy making. For Colombia, he notes,  for example, that: (1) politi- 
cians have a strong incentive to assure that the party, not themselves,  be re- 
elected; (2) the Central Bank and the Planning Institute have relatively high 
technical standards. Moreover, they are relatively free from political pressure 
or pressure from vested economic interests. 
Thus, an implication of the paper is that politicians/economists  (“policon- 
omists,” for short) tend to have a longer-term perspective than they would in 
the absence of the above type of institutional framework, which can help to 
explain Colombia’s low inflation and low fiscal deficits relative to other Latin 
American countries. 
However,  typical  populist  experiments are characterized  by  injutionury 
cycles: inflation rises dramatically for a while and then comes down dramati- 
cally after a strong stabilization program is adopted. Why is Colombia rela- 
tively free from inflation cycles? 
The absence of inflation cycles cannot be explained by the presence of low- 
subjective-discount-rate  policonomists, as the Time Inconsistency  literature 
shows.‘ Point 2 above, however, suggests the existence of a highly structured 
and bureaucratized  class of policonomists in Colombia. The latter, in turn, is 
likely to contribute to the emergence of a relatively slow policy-making  ma- 
chinery, which makes it more difficult to implement “surprise-type” policies 
(like a surprise, not preannounced, devaluation). Since surprise-type policies 
appear to be at the heart of high-inflation episodes, the institutional aspects 
emphasized by Urrutia are, thus, potentially capable of explaining the lack of 
inflation cycles in Colombia. (Incidentally, the theorist should take note be- 
cause there seems to be some interesting theory to be developed in this re- 
spect.) 
I strongly feel that the institutional aspects stressed by Urrutia should go a 
long  way  into explaining cross-country inflation  experiences. However,  I 
think that a more complete explanation should also account for policy  mis- 
takes-either  as a result of sheer incompetence or because of  incomplete in- 
formation. I suspect that policy  mistakes  leading to high inflation  have be- 
come  more  prevalent  in  recent  times.  The  reason  being  that  financial 
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innovations may have shrunk the base of the inflation tax beyond the expecta- 
tions of policymakers. Thus, the same budget deficit gives rise to larger infla- 
tion (like it is the case in Colombia, as shown in Urrutia’s paper), and it may 
actually no longer be consistent with steady inflation. The latter would happen 
if  the  deficit  to be  monetized  exceeded  the maximum  steady-state revenue 
from the inflation tax. Thus, a not-fully-expected shrinkage of the base of the 
inflation tax could place otherwise stable economies into an hyperinflationary 
path. 
Policy  mistakes  are more likely to happen, the closer the government is 
from extracting the maximum steady-state revenue from inflation.  Closeness 
from this maximum could be dictated by the institutional aspects emphasized 
by Urrutia, but it could also be the result of higher government expenditure 
due to, for instance,  higher service on foreign debt or a deterioration in the 
country’s terms of trade. Consequently, “size of government"-especially, the 
unanticipated  part-could  also be  positively  correlated  with  populist  epi- 
sodes, even when governments have the incentives not to utilize surprise-type 
policies. 
Urrutia’s paper opens new and very interesting vistas on the populism is- 
sue, and especially on high-inflation episodes. Let us hope that other similar 
studies will  soon follow to be able to test more thoroughly the proposition 
that,  as Urrutia’s paper  implies, “inflation  is an institutional phenomenon” 
(with apologies to Milton Friedman). 